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EMPLOYEE INSURANCE BENEFIT PLANS
AND DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF HANDICAP
Dr. Larry D. Baker* and Catherine Karol**
The insurance industry has generallq regarded handicapped per-
sons as undesirable risks; the corresponding reluctance to extend
equal coverage has complicated the achievement of equal employ-
ment opportunities for such individuals. Regulations governing in-
surance practices impose restrictions and increase costs of
employers, so that compliance with affirmative hiring policies
mandated by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is difficult, if not fi-
nancially prohibitive. In response to these problems, Dr. Baker
and Ms. Karol offer solutions worthy of immediate consideration
by those organizations confronted with suits claiming unequal
protection in their employee benefits.
In 1954, a federal district court in South Carolina upheld the denial
of a life insurance claim to the estate of an insured who had been
killed by lightning. The insurance company denied the claim because
the decedent, unknown to the company at the time the policy was
issued in 1949, had lost his foot 30 years previously. The court in
Senn v. Old American Insurance Corporation 1 found that a policy
exclusion of any person who had lost any limb or sight from both eyes
was valid, and that therefore no policy had taken effect since the
decedent was in the excluded class. Reasoning that the insurer had
the right to deny coverage for a risk which it regarded as more
hazardous and less desirable than it wished to insure, the Senn court
did not consider the titter lack of causal connection between the de-
cedent's disability and his death.
In life, health, disability, accident, and workmen's compensation
insurance, the physically and mentally handicapped have been sub-
jected routinely to such categorization on the basis of their dis-
abilities. Little or no regard has been given to the correlation of their
*Assistant Professor of Management and Organizational Behavior, University of Missouri-
St. Louis; B.S., Insurance, Indiana University, 1968; M.B.A., Indiana University, 1970;
D.B.A., Indiana University, 1972.
**B.A., College of New Rochelle, 1975; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1978.
The authors wish to acknowledge several persons who assisted in the preparation of this
paper. Ms. Patricia Ritcher and Ms. Shirley McKinney, Affirmative Action Project staff, Univer-
sity of Missouri-St. Louis and Mr. Ron Drury, Vice President of Group Underwriting, Gen-
eral American Life Insurance Company, who aided with the insurance industry survey and
preparation of the draft.
1. 120 F. Supp. 422 (E.D.S.C. 1954). See also Reed v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 227 Mo.
App. 1155, 60 S.W.2d 59, 60 (1933), where the policy exclusion was of persons "maimed,
crippled or deformned, or bereft of reason, sight or hearing." id.
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disabilities with the increase in risk they are perceived to represent.
In fact, neither society nor the government ever have demanded any
verification that such correlation exists. Historically, we have ac-
cepted as undisputed fact that a handicapped person, regardless of
what the handicap may be, has a much greater risk of injury and
disease, and will of course die at a much earlier age. Society on the
whole never has been troubled by the exclusion of the handicapped
friom insurance coverage. Where coverage was extended, the possi-
blity of higher rates was not troubling to the non-actuarial eye be-
cause there appeared to be a rational basis for such measures.
Different treatment of the handicapped by insurance companies has
resulted in a double hardship for affected individuals. The most obvi-
oIs is the inability to get insurance in a world which has responded
to spiraling medical costs with health and disability packages, and
where a program of personal savings for old age is rapidly being re-
placed with a program of insurance. A more subtle hardship being
forced upon the handicapped individual by insurance differentiation
lies in the area of employment discrimination. Employers, both
well-meaning and otherwise, who offer their employees insurance
coverage under a group policy, as either a fringe benefit or part of
their compensation, routinely turn away handicapped applicants be-
cause of the increased insurance costs they supposedly represent. 2
For instance, in 1976, a Wisconsin circuit court found an employer
guilty of discrimination when he refused to hire a job applicant who
suffered from acute lymphocytic leukemia. 3 The employer did not
contend that the applicant was unable to perform duties required by
the job; rather, his decision was based on the applicant's higher risk
of absenteeism and the higher costs involved in insuring him. The
court found the employer guilty of discrimination on the basis of
handicap, but two uncomfortable questions are left unanswered.
First, is the employer the real perpetrator of the discrimination, or is
guilt more properly assessed against the insurance companies who
control the costs? Second, are the higher costs and resultant reluc-
tance on the part of employers discriminatory, or are they in fact
rational reflections of the risk applicable to the handicapped?
The purpose of this Article is to examine the insurance coverage
being offered to handicapped employees as a benefit of their
2. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AN TIlE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WORKER 12, 13 (1961),
where reasons given by employers for their refusal to hire disabled workers include safety fac-
tors, fear of higher insurance costs, and resistance by fellow workers.
3. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dept. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (Wis. 1976).
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employment, and to expose the inconsistent treatment they receive.
The responsibilities under the law of both the employer and the in-
surer will be discussed, and some possibilities for reform will be
suggested.
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE HANDICAPPED
Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
While society and government have always shown some concern
with the physically and mentally disabled, that concern historically
has been paternalistic. Unlike many other minorities, the handi-
capped have long been the focus of much legislation and funding from
a multitude of state and private agencies. Until recently, the attention
given to the handicapped has been of a charitable nature, with scant
heed being paid to their status as citizens deserving equal rights.
Within the past decade the trend has shifted to a gradual awareness
of the handicapped as contributing members of society. While they
have not been accorded coverage by the federal equal employment
legislation which benefits other minorities, 4 a number of states have
included the handicapped in their fair employment acts. 5 The fed-
eral government also has initiated legislation which, though jurisdic-
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 1-17 to h-2 (1970).
5. Thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and New York City now prohibit discrimina-
tion against the handicapped: See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CAL LAB.
CODE §§ 1413(h), 1420(a), 1432.5 (West Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ I-If, 31- 12 6(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); District of Columbia, Regulation No. 73-22 (Nov. 11, 1973); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (1968, amended 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08 (3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); HAw.
REV. STAT. §§ 378-1(7), -2, -9 (1968 & Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 65-21, -23
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1971); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-2, 22 -9-1-3(q), 22-9-1-13 (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.2(11), .6(1)(West 1975); KAN. STAT. §§ 44-1001,
-1002(j), -1009(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 207.130(2), .150(1)(1977); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4552, 4553.7-A, 4572 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17,
18(g), 19(a), 20 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24K (Cum. Supp. 1976);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.550(103)(b), (202) (Callaghan Statutes Release No. 10 at 761, Oct. 4,
1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01, Subd. 25; .03, Subd. 1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 43-6-15 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-305(10), (13), -306(1)(a),
-307(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(8), -1104, -1108(1) (1974); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 613.330, .350(1), (2) (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:3(13), -A:8 (Supp. 1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1, -5(q) (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-2(k), -7 (1974); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21), 296(1), (1-a)(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); N.Y.C. AD. CODE ch.
1, §§ B1-7.0(3a) (c), BI-7.1(1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01(K), (M), .02(A) (Page Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.400, .425
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 28-5-6(H), -7 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4419e, §§ 1, 3(g) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Cum.
Supp. (1977); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (Repl. vol. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1976);
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Cum. Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32(5)(a), (f) (West 1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
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tionally limited, demands the making of reasonable accommodations
to insure that the handicapped individual enters the mainstream of
society. 6 In terms of employment, recent federal legislation has been
geared toward insuring (1) that the focus in hiring a handicapped per-
son is on the ability to do a job, rather than on the disability; (2) that
when a handicapped person's ability to perform the job adequately is
dependent upon some accommodation, that accommodation will be
made; and (3) that a handicapped employee will be compensated in
the same measure as a non-handicapped employee. In terms of insur-
ance benefits, individual determination, reasonable accommodation
and equal compensation all make some demands on the prospective
employer of a handicapped applicant.
The legislation presently exerting the most impact on employment
of the handicapped is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 7 That part of
the statute concerned with employment is essentially a policy state-
ment, providing that anyone who contracts with the federal gov-
ernment to perform services shall take affirmative action to employ
qualified handicapped individuals.8 In addition, where a program or
activity receives federal financial assistance, discrimination against any
qualified handicapped person is prohibited. 9 However, the regula-
tions thus far promulgated are much more comprehensive, and deal
specifically with employment practices.'" Section 503 regulations
promulgated by the United States Department of Labor require a
government contractor to take affirmative action in the employment,
advancement and treatment of handicapped individuals without dis-
crimination based upon their physical or mental handicap." With
reference to employment, HEW's section 504 regulations provide
6. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V. 1975), accompany-
ing regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (1977) and 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1 to 84.61 (1977).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V. 1975).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. V. 1975).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V. 1975).
10. Regulations for Section 503 have been promulgated by the Department of Labor, Office
of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) 41 C.F.R. § 60.741.1 to 741.54 (1977), and
for Section 504 thus far only by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 84.1 to 84.61 (1977). Under Executive Order 11914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976), HEW is
required to issue general standards for other departments and agencies of the federal govern-
ment to follow in promulgating Section 504 regulations. The proposed regulations were issued
by HEW in January, 1978 43 Fed. Reg. No. 9 (Jan. 13, 1978). Thus, it is anticipated that
regulations will be forthcoming shortly from other agencies. For the purposes of the issues dealt
with in this article, the employment section of the HEW regulations and the guideline regula-
tions are substantially the same.
11. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, 4(a) (1977). The regulation specifically includes "rates of pay or
other compensation" as an area of employment requiring treatment without discrimination.
[Vol. 27:10131016
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that "no qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap,
be subjected to discrimination in employment under any program or
activity to which this part applies." 12
The provisions of this subpart are explicitly applicable to "rates of
pay or any other form of compensation and changes in compensa-
tion" 13 and "fringe benefits available by virtue of employment
whether or not administered by the recipients." 14 Thus, inclusion of
a handicapped employee in employee insurance programs is clearly
mandated by the Section 504 regulations for any employer who is a
recipient of federal financial assistance. While some discussion has
arisen as to whether the same mandate applies to federal contrac-
tors, 1 5 the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), United States Department of Labor, is covering fringe
benefits under the Section 503 regulations to the same extent as the
Section 504 regulations.
What then are the employer's responsibilities toward insurance
benefits? The proposed Section 504 regulations issued in July, 1976,
included a section, later struck, which read:
(a) In making fringe benefits available to employees, a recipient
may not: (1) Administer, operate, offer, or participate in a fringe
benefit plan which does not provide for equal benefits to handi-
capped and nonhandicapped persons and equal contributions to the
plan by handicapped persons unless any difference in benefits or
contributions is justified by. verifiable actuarial figures and an ac-
tual, substantial increase in cost to the recipient .... 16
In its Analysis of the Final Regulation, HEW explained the deletion
by stating: "The Department [HEW] believes that currently available
data and, experience do not demonstrate a basis for promulgating a
regulation specifically allowing for differences in benefits or contribu-
tions." 17 HEW's position is apparently based on the assumption that,
in most instances, there are no perceptible differences between hand-
icapped and non-handicapped persons in employee benefit insurance
claims, and therefore identical coverage can and should be provided
to both at a comparable cost.
However, the employer's obligation with regard to fringe benefits
does not end with the provision of similar insurance plans to both
12. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(1) (1977).
13. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(3) (1977).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(6) (1977).
15. See, e.g., Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26
EMORY L.J. 65, 74-80 (1977).
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.18) (emphasis added).
17. Appendix A - Analysis of Final Regulation, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685 (1977).
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handicapped and non-handicapped employees. Furthermore, the
employer-recipient is prohibited by Section 84.11(4) of the 504 regu-
lations from participating in a contractual or other relationship with
organizations providing or administering fringe benefits to employees
of the recipient, if such a relationship has the effect of subjecting
qualified handicapped persons to discrimination. It would appear,
therefore, that when there is discrimination among insurees by an
insurance company on the basis of handicap, an employer receiving
federal funds may not offer that company's plan to any of his em-
ployees. 18
However, must the discrimination on the basis of handicap by the
insurer be an unreasonable one to be so proscribed? Or is even an
actuarially verifiable differentiation on the basis of handicap prohib-
ited? Assuming that only unreasonable differentiation on the part of
the insurer is proscribed, and that an actuarially verifiable cost in-
crease exists with regard to a handicapped employee, is the
employer's responsibility merely to make a contribution on the part of
the handicapped person equal to that which he makes on the part of a
non-handicapped person? Or is his responsibility to make sufficient
contributions on the part of the handicapped employee to insure that
the same benefits inure to him as to any non-handicapped person?
Finally, where the handicapped person is deemed an uninsurable
risk, what then is the employer's responsibility in light of the regula-
tions?
INSURANCE PRACTICES AND THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
lndustry Practices
The employer's obligation under the federal regulations is to pro-
vide insurance benefits without discrimination. Yet, how employers
and group insurance underwriters are to reasonably carry out this re-
sponsibility remains unclear. Some knowledge of the insurance
mechanism and its functions in a free competitive system is essential
to an understanding of the complexity of the problems posed.
Employers may provide employee group insurance in any of five
different forms: life, accidental death and dismemberment, short-term
disability, long-term disability, and health.19 The basic principle be-
hind these forms is one of "reducing the risk and spreading the loss."
18. Thus, while the Section 504 regulations do not directly affect insurance companies in
their capacity as insurer's, some leverage is provided against the insurer as well as the
employer.
19. A survey of the underwriting practices of approximately 30 major group insurance un-
derwriters was conducted by the authors. Twenty-one insurers responded and not all under-
1018 [Vol. 27:1013
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Risk relates to the degree of probability that a loss will be incurred.
Spreading the loss is then accomplished by extending insurance
coverage to a sufficient number of persons so that the distribution of
losses can be predicted with a high degree of certainty. Similarly, the
concept of hazard is related to the value of the loss which may be
experienced. Thus, the cost of insurance is a function of (1) the de-
gree of risk, or probability, that a loss will occur, (2) the value of the
hazard being insured, (3) the number of persons purchasing insurance
under the plan, and (4) the overhead and operating expenses incurred
by the insurance company. Any factors which would substantially
alter one or more of these variables will ultimately affect the cost of
insurance. In order to arrive at the rates charged to individual in-
sureds, the insureds are classified on the basis of factors which are
relevant to the expected risk of loss. Individual insureds are grouped
according to the expected risk of loss so that everyone in the same
rate classification has approximately the same risk of loss and is pur-
chasing protection having the same unit value as that sold to others in
the class. 20
While different underwriting problems are posed in each form of
insurance, some of the most serious are to be found in health and
long-term disability insurance. Because of soaring health care costs, a
sick or injured employee often incurs medical expenses running into
thousands of dollars. An extraordinary risk under a group health pol-
icy could result in losses far outweighing the value of the premiums
charged for the coverage. Moreover, a group policy such as long-term
disability insurance can pose an extraordinary hazard and result in
extremely large claims to the insurer. 21  For example, a critical in-
jury to a young man in the course of his employment could result in
write every line of group insurance. Data collected in the survey indicated that the forms of
group insurance most frequently underwritten are life and health. Many of the firms surveyed
included coverage for accidental death and dismemberment as an integral part of their life
insurance policy. Long-term and short-term disability coverage are less frequently written.
20. STATEMENT OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE As-
OCIATION OF AMERICA, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE DEPARTMENT HEARING ON INSURING VISU-
ALLY OR PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS (June 22, 1976):
In the very early days of insurance it was often assumed that the fiurest way to
operate was to charge each insured an equal rate. [However, this] approach ...
failed to take into account the fact that new insureds who were characterized by
impaired health or involvement in dangerous activities brought greater risks to the
mechanism. When rates were not equitably differentiated on the basis of individual
risk factors, an ever-increasing number of the better risks elected not to participate
in the insurance mechanism, leading to an upward spiral of claim and premium
rates and the eventual collapse of the arrangement.
21. The SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INCOME PROGRAM (SSDI) is a form of long-term
disability coverage. Most group insurance underwriters have found the coverage provided by
this publicly funded program to be unprofitable.
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payment of a claim equal to a portion of his salary for 40 or 50 years
by the employer's insurance company. By the very nature of the
coverage provided, both health and long-term disability insurance
pose intricate problems for the insurer. 22
Life, accidental death and dismemberment, and short-term disabil-
ity insurance present less of an underwriting problem. The potential
loss under these forms is limited to a fixed amount for the hazards
insured (in the case of life and accidental death and dismemberment
insurance), or a fixed period of time (for short-term disability insur-
ance). 23
Group Insurance: Deviations From The Regulations
In underwriting individual coverage, insurers have found it neces-
sary to develop classifications, particularly on the basis of age and sex,
in order to incorporate the principle of insurance. When underwriting
group insurance, however, the insurance industry has not been per-
mitted to use such classifications. The basic objective in group insur-
ance is to charge an appropriate premium for the risk by assessing the
risk presented by a group with a fair degree of accuracy and with a
lower underwriting expense than in individual insurance. The need
for accuracy in prediction of losses is reduced by the fact that in most
group policies, the premium rate applies for only one year at a time,
and therefore can be changed each year to reflect knowledge acquired
from the group's experience under the policy. 24 The approach to
group underwriting is to select groups on some basis other than the
22. See SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES TRANSACTIONS, 1976 REPORTS OF MORTALITY AND MOR-
BIDITY EXPERIENCE 119-120 (1977), which shows that long-term disability insurance claims
tend to increase in periods of economic recession.
The primary consideration in underwriting insurance is not the rate to be charged, but
rather whether there is an insurable risk. Where an insurable risk exists, it is possible to deter-
mine a reasonable rate. This does not mean that a rate could not he determined for every risk,
but rather that it is simply not tfeasible to insure some risks. For example, it would be possible
to underwrite a thousand dollar life insurance policy for a person expected to (lie of cancer
within the next twenty-four hours. In such a situation, the probability of loss is so great there is
actually very little risk involved. Moreover, the premium for the coverage would exceed $1,000,
since it would have to include the expected loss and the insurance company's expenses for
underwriting the policy.
23. Accidental death and dismemberment insurance in group coverage is the same as that
known as double indemnity insurance in individual policies. If accidental death occurs, benefits
in addition to the life benefits are paid to the beneficiary. Dismemberment insurance covers
loss of extremities and usually loss of vision, with the benefit schedule expressed as predeter-
mined portions of the face value of the life coverage.
24. If handicapped employees pose a greater insurance risk than non-handicapped
employees, employers who are rated on the basis of experience will have higher insurance costs
1020 [Vol. 27:1013
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individual insurability characteristics of group members. The lower
cost of group insurance results from savings obtained through cover-
ing many insureds under a single policy. The rates charged an
employer, however, are determined by several characteristics of the
entire group, such as age, sex, hazard of the industry, and geographic
location. 25 The profile of an entire group is used to determine the
premium cost per member. If an employee is not excluded from
coverage, then the rate charged for that person will be the same as
that charged every other group member. 26
An important l)rinciple in group insurance underwriting is that the
prospective insureds should have some reason for belonging to the
group which is more important than the desire for insurance. For
example, if the group consists of the employees of al employer, the
individuals' jobs are, for most of them, the main reason why they
joined the group. If this were not true there might be many individu-
als who had joined the group in order to get insurance which might
not have been available to them at a reasonable rate had they applied
for it as individuals. Those persons who were poor risks for individual
insurance would cause the group as a whole to be a bad risk for group
insurance. 27
than if they employ no handicapped workers. In the survey an attempt was made to determine
work-force size at which experience rating would be initiated. The responses were extremely
diverse between different lines of insurance and within each line. Some insurance companies
pool the claim experiences of the employers they insure and never experience rate individual
employers. In life insurance, one out of nineteen respondents do so, accidental death and dis-
memberment, six of nineteen, long-term disability, five of sixteen. Work force size at which
experience rating was initiated varied from twenty-five to one thousand persons with the major-
ity being at either fifty or one hundred. Two insurers based their experience rating on the
amount of the annual premium charged the employer. These amounts were $25,000 and
$65,000.
25. Regulation of insurance rates is typically restricted to individual insurance policies. In
group insurance underwriting, insurers experience little if any rate control or regulation. The
modernization of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (NAIC), MODEL
GROUP LIFE INSURANCE DEFINITION AND STANDARI) PROVISION does not contain a section
pertaining to rate regulation, nor does the model bill currently being used by NAIC. See notes
49-51 infra.
26. Survey responses reveal that none of the insurers apply a special rate to a handicapped
person who is a member of a true group. For the definition of a true group, see note 34 infra.
27. Obviously, whi-n the cost of insuring several handicapped individuals is ascribed to a
group, any extra cost per group member will be smaller than the extra cost to each handicapped
individual would be if he sought individual insurance on his own. Since about 92% of the
applications for individual life insurance are accepted at standard rates, it seems fair to assume
that the per-member cost of insuring a representative group of employed individuals is not
much greater than the cost of insuring a group of individuals all of whom are "standard" risks. If
the term "'handicap" does not include health conditions such as heart disease or diabetes which
sometimes necessitate higher ratings or rejection for individual insurance, then the per-member
cost of insuring handicapped members of a representative group is probably quite small.
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Several other requirements must also be met in order to obtain
group policy coverage. A high percentage of the members of the
group must be insured tinder the group policy-otherwise, those
members who were the poorest risks would choose to become in-
suredi under the group policy, while the better risks would opt
out. 28  In order to become insured under the group policy, a
member must be actively at work on the day on which the insurance
becomes effective. In order to prevent an individual who is in good
health from not joining an insurance plan unless and until such a time
as he may actually need it, a requirement of submission of evidence
of insurability is usually imposed upon a "late entrant" (i.e., a
member of a group who does not elect to join the plan within 31
days). 29
Customarily, group insurance protection is restricted to employees
classified as full-time, which is defined generally in terms of a
minimum number (twenty or thirty) of hours per week. Part-time
employees are excluded not only for administrative reasons, but also
to eliminate potential abuse of the group insurance program by indi-
viduals in poor health who become employed solely to gain the ad-
vantages of the insurance benefits. Both Sections 503 and 504 contain
language requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations for
handicapped employees of known physical and mental limitations.3 0
While part-time employment may be used by employers to accom-
modate the limitations of an employee, 31 the health condition requir-
ing part-time employment may be the very condition an insurer
wishes to avoid if it results in an extraordinary risk. Present under-
writing practices of insurers typically do not allow employers to ob-
tain coverage for their part-time workers, thereby making it impossi-
ble to meet their nondiscrimination obligations in providing benefits
to those employees.
Any significant change in the composition of an insured group
which increases the risk and the hazard to be insured will have to be
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LIFE AND
HEALTH INSURANCE AND HANDICAPPED PERSONS (paper presented to the White House Con-
ference on Handicapped Individuals) (1977).
28. In practice, high participation in a group plan is typically achieved by having the
employer pay most or all of the cost of such insurance.
29. Such evidence would consist of answers to questions about health, or possibly a physical
examination. However, the individual's insurability would not be assessed as rigorously as if he
were applying for an individual policy.
30. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977).
31. "Reasonable accommodation may include.., part-time or modified work
schedules. ... 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1977).
1022 [Vol. 27:1013
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reflected in the cost of the insurance. The definitions of a handi-
capped person 32 and physical and mental impairments 33 adopted in
the 1974 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act extend the nondis-
crimination and affirmative action coverage under the Act to persons
who have impairments not included among those persons traditionally
considered handicapped. Persons with cardiovascular disease, cancer,
asthma, diabetes and other debilitating conditions typically have been
considered to be "sick persons," not handicapped. Therefore, using
traditional principles, concepts, programs and services to serve the
broader class of handicapped persons may be inadequate. In particu-
lar, the requirement that insurers and employers provide coverage to
qualified handicapped employees having severe physical or mental
impairments may increase the risk and losses experienced. If an in-
crease in losses results in higher claims, experience rating requires
that premiums paid by the employer increase. The question then be-
comes one of whether increased cost is significant and therefore un-
reasonable for the employer to bear-providing that the insurance
industry even makes the coverage available.
In the case of small groups 3 4 some degree of individual underwrit-
ing is necessary to assure that such a small group will constitute a
reasonably acceptable risk. However, members of the group usually
are accepted on a more liberal basis than in individual insurance. If a
handicapped person becomes employed by a small company, there is
a possibility that he may be subjected to an extra premium for his
specific condition, denied coverage,3 5 or subjected to a general pre-
32. "Handicapped person" means any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1) (1977).
33. "'Physical or mental impairment' means (A) any physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; car-
diovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;
or (B) any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1977).
34. To prevent confusion over terms used to identify groups by size, several terms used in
the industry must be explained. A true group, or large group, is a group of sufficient size that
minimum restrictions are placed on extending coverage. A small group has fewer members than
a true group, usually less than 10, and is not expected to reflect a normal risk pattern. Small
groups also have a minimum size, but the minimum varies according to state legislation and/or
individual insurance company practice. Regardless of how the minimum number for a small
group is determined, the potential for adverse selection is so great that group coverage is not
available. Thus, insurance for small groups is written on the same basis as are individual
policies.
35. The survey results for small groups revealed that some insurers would charge a higher
rate for handicapped members. About 50% of the insurers would rate handicapped persons
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existing conditions limitation in the policy. Under a pre-existing con-
ditions provision, an insured member who has received treatment for
an illness or injury within six months prior to the effective date of his
coverage under the group policy may not become insured with re-
spect to that particular illness or injury until he has gone three
months without treatment or has been insured for twelve months,
whichever is earlier. 36
individually in small groups for long-term disability insurance; 20-25% for life, short-term disa-
bility and medical insurance; and less than 10% for accidental death and dismemberment insur-
ance.
Only one insurer underwriting long-term disability insurance for small groups indicated that
it classifies persons as handicapped or non-handicapped for purposes of determining the rate
level of the entire group. Responses from all other insurers for the remaining four lines of
insurance indicated that no such classifications would be used in determining the rates for such
a group.
When asked about conditions which would result in denial of coverage, all of the respon-
dents who specified conditions which might not be covered listed malignant diseases and al-
coholism. Seventy-five percent of the respondents would not cover cardiovascular or gastrointes-
tinal diseases, diabetes, drug addiction, epilepsy, systemic diseases (including diseases of the
blood, neuromuscular, respiratory or neuropsychiatric systems) or spinal defects. Many of the
conditions for which insurers would deny coverage traditionally have been considered illnesses
rather than handicaps. Typical handicapping conditions such as hearing, speech and visual im-
pairments, mental retardation, or absence of extremities were cited infrequently or not at all for
purposes of coverage exclusion. All of the conditions studied were taken from the "OFCCP's
Code of Handicapping Conditions (for Complaint)."
36. It is important to note that the pre-existing conditions limitation excludes initial cover-
age only for the existing illness or injury. The person is immediately insured for any other
conditions, and will eventually be insured for the pre-existing condition as well' Only one true
group underwriter stated that the waiver of pre-existing limitations clauses was an important
consideration when underwriting group life, accidental death and dismemberment, and short-
term disability insurance. Slightly over half of the firms treated the waiver as an important
consideration in underwriting long-term disability insurance, and a little over one-third stated
that it was important in writing health insurance. This data suggests tlat the waiver is most
important in those lines of insurance in which insurers are likely to incur the greatest risk of
loss and value of the hazard insured. This waiver, which can be obtained with an extra cost to
the employer, results in all employees receiving identical coverage, regardless of any pre-
existing conditions.
Only one of the nineteen respondents offered the waiver as an option in life insurance, none
in accidental death and dismemberment, and ten in health insurance. Two of the eighteen
respondents writing short-term disability insurance offered the option, while six out of sixteen
long-term writers did. By and large, the insurers who did not believe the waiver for the pre-
existing conditions limitations was an important consideration also tended not to offer the waiver
as an option. Insurers believing the waiver to be an important consideration tended to offer it as
an option. These were insurers writing long-term disability and health insurance, coverages with
potentially high risks and extreme hazards.
Two of fifteen responding life insurers reported 100% of their policies contained waivers; the
remaining 13 reported zero percent. For accidental death and dismemberment, seventeen in-
surers reported zero percent and one reported 100%. One short-term disability insurer reported
30%, the other seventeen reported zero percent. Zero percent was reported by nine for long-
term disability insurers, three reported 10%, and one each reported 30%, 40%, and 90%.
Little more importance was given to the waiver for the pre-existing conditions limitations
clause for small groups than large groups. Only two of the insurers writing long term disability
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The insurance industry's uniform application of the pre-existing
conditions limitations may discriminate against persons having less
severe conditions. The six month, three month and the twelve month
absence of treatment requirement may not be the only time periods
used by all insurers, but typically they are applied to all pre-existing
conditions. Some health care data suggests that this is not justified.3 7
Since some types of handicaps could have shorter or longer time
periods to be commensurate with the risk present, such practices are
as arbitrary as the policy exclusion in the Senn case.3 8
If the insurance industry had given greater attention to the ex-
panded definition of physical and mental impairments and used avail-
able morbidity and mortality data in response to HEW's proposed
Section 504 regulations, it could have argued strongly for the exist-
ence of verifiable actuarial figures and a substantial increase in cost
to employers for group insurance. The failure of the insurance indus-
try to use available data clearly illustrating potential cost differences
between handicapped and non-handicapped persons has resulted in a
government expectation and employer dependence upon the insur-
ance industry to provide equal benefits at equal cost to handicapped
employees, regardless of the severity or type of handicap involved.39
This expectation undoubtedly contributed to HEW's deletion of Sec-
tion 84.18 from the final draft of the Section 504 regulations. This
deletion poses several difficult problems if the insurance claims of
handicapped persons are not substantially the same as for non-
handicapped persons.
First, implicit in the deletion is an assumption that handicapped
persons have substantially the same claim costs as non-handicapped
insurance stated the waiver was an important consideration in extending coverage while over
one-third (five of fourteen) believed it to be important in writing health insurance for small
groups.
Few insurers included the waiver in small group life, accidental death and dismemberment,
and short-term disability insurance policies. The waiver is contained, however, in a small
number of long-term disability and medical insurance policies.
37. See note 40 infra.
38. See note 1 supra.
39. "[TIhe insurer's underwriting standards and rating classifications are not in every detail
based on hard, statistical data. There are many types of health conditions whose effect on claim
costs under various types of insurance coverage has not been observed in such a way as to
provide a statistically significant base for insurance ratings. Accordingly, underwriting proce-
dures are based on the application of sound actuarial principles and underwriting judgment to
whatever relevant data are at hand." AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE AND THE
HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, September 13,
1976. In light of the data available to the insurance industry, this was a weak and inadequate
response.
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persons. However, a comparison of the defition of a handicapped per-
son under the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act and data
available through both HEW and the insurance industry indicates
that this may be an erroneous assumption. 4 0 The data strongly
40. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV-
ICE, HEALTIH RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, Limitation of Activity Due to Chronic Conditions,
Series 10, Number III, 15 (1974). Information in this report indicates that the three leading
causes of activity limitations are heart condition, arthritis and rheumatism, and hypertension
without heart involvement, whereas those conditions typically considered handicaps, such as
paralysis, visual impairments, amputations, and mental retardation, are less limiting to ac-
tivities. Another HEW study indicates that persons with chronic limitations require more medi-
cal attention and experience more restrictions in their activities than persons without chronic
disabilities. For example, these age adjusted data show that such persons experience approxi-
mately two and one-half times more physician visits per person than those not so limited.
The table below is one example of the data which demonstrates potentially higher costs of
insurance claims for impaired versus non-impaired persons:
HEALTH CHARACTERISTIC WITH NO WITH LIMITATION OF ACTIVITY
AGE-ADJUSTED LIMITATION Limited Limited Unable To
OF ACTIVITY But Not InI Amount Carry On
In Major Or Kind Major
Activity Of Major Activity
Activity
Number of Physician
visits in the Office per 2.9 4.9 7.4 8.6
person per year
Percent of persons with
one or more short-stay
hospital episodes with- 8.7 14.4 22.0 41.6
in a year of interview
Number of discharges from
short-stay hospitals per 1(.5 18.6 31.8 81.3
100 persons per year
Average length of stay
for discharges from 6.5 8.2 9.5 19.2
short-stay hospitals
Days of restricted
activity per person 10.2 26.1 50.5 100.0
per year
Days of bed disability
per person per year 4.2 8.5 16.7 48.8
U.S. I)EPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTII SERVICE,
HEALTH RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, Health Characteristic of Persons with Chronic Activity
Limitation, Series 112, 3 (1974).
R. SINGER AND L. LEVINSON, MEI)ICAL RISKS: PATTERNS OF MORTALITY AND SURVIVAL
(1976). This book is widely used by insurance underwriters and contains statistical data on mor-
tality associated with many physical and mental impairments. Data are expressed as percent-
ages, with normal life expectancy representing a base line of 100%. Thus, an impairment with a
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suggest that the insurance mechanism will not be effective in meeting
the group insurance needs of employers of the handicapped. A public
benefit program, rather than an insurance benefit program may be
essential for these employers to overcome the problems of adverse
risk and increased hazard associated with employing certain types of
handicapped persons.
Second, this increased hazard will not allow the principle of risk
used in insurance underwriting to function effectively. Where the risk
principle on which insurance practices are based will not function, it
is not possible to simultaneously provide equal contributions and
equal benefits.
Third, a paradox is created for insurance providers and employers if
insurance companies are expected to underwrite a coverage which
falls outside their normal limits of acceptable risk, thereby violating
the principles which allow the insurance industry to function in a
competitive market. Even if the employer desired to provide equal
contributions and equal benefits to handicapped employees, it would
not be possible under present underwriting practices of the insurance
industry. Moreover, mandating insurers to violate the principle of in-
surance to provide employers equal coverage for all handicapped and
non-handicapped workers on the basis of equal cost places insurers in
the role of providing public benefits rather than insurance benefits.
INSURANCE PRACTICES UNDER STATE REGULATION
Since a contract for insurance rests upon the assent of the parties,
an insurance company is not bound to accept an application or pro-
posal for insurance, but may reject it for any reason. 41 An insurer can
select the risks it will insure, 42 limit recovery to a return on the
percentage value greater than 100 indicates an above normal mortality rate. An example of the
expected mortality for some of the impairments covered by the legal definition are as follows:
cancer of all types, only 67% live five years or more; heart disease, 156%; hypertension between
the ages of 35-45, 139 systaltic, 127% and 160 systaltic, 190%; cerebral vascular disease, under
the age of 25, 1600% and over the age of 75, 360%; paraplegia over the age of 45, 111%;
quadriplegia over the age of 45, 375%; mental retardation over the age of 12, 1930%; and
diabetes, 212%. Persons with these impairments now protected against discrimination on the
basis of handicap obviously do not have a normal mortality rate. Upon inspection, no data were
found for traditional handicapping conditions such as blindness, deafness and amputation which
suggests a normal, or near normal, life expectancy.
41. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Young, 23 Wall 85, 23 L.Ed. 152 (1875);
United States Ins. Co. v. Headrick, 275 Ala. 594, 157 So.2d 19 (1936); Kimbro v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 134 Iowa 84, 108 N.W. 1025 (1906); Cauman v. American Credit Indem. Co. of N.Y., 229
Mass. 278, 118 N.E. 259 (1918); Harding v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. of Hamilton, Ohio, 230 Minn.
327, 41 N.W.2d 818 (1950); Lechler v. Mont. Life Ins. Co. of Helena, Mont., 48 N.D. 644, 186
N.W. 271 (1921).
42. Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y., 189 Kan. 459, 370 P.2d 379 (1962).
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premium paid under certain circumstances, 43 or limit its liability if
the insured dies within a specified time from a serious disease or
illness for which he had been treated before the policy was issued.
Provisions of insurance policies excepting particular losses from
coverage are ordinarily valid, for the parties to a contract of insurance
have the right to limit or qualify the extent of the insurer's liability in
any manner consistent with statutory provisions and public policy.
44
A number of' states have enacted statutes which prohibit insurance
companies from discriminating between insurants of the same class.
45
Statutes also have begun to appear which specifically prohibit dis-
crimination in accident, sickness and/or life insurance for persons
afflicted with various handicaps solely on the basis of that handicap.
Blindness, deafness, and mental retardation are the most often cir-
cumscribed conditions for refusal to issue a policy. 46  Typically, state
43. Life & Cas. his. Co. of Tenn. v. Womak, 26 Ala. App. 6, 151 So. 881 (1933), cert.
denied, 228 Ala. 70, 151 So. 880 (1934).
44. See, e.g., Kirkby v. Fed. Life Ins. Co., 35 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1929); Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of United States v. Arrowood, 253 Ky. 456, 69 S.W.2d 984 (1934); Reed v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1155, 60 S.W.2d 59 (1933).
45. CAL. INS. CODE § 10123 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2159-A
(Cum. Supp. 1977-78); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, §§ 120A-120B (West Cum. Supp.
1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-251-5-
58-251-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Oiiio REV. CODE ANN. § 3999.16 (Page Cum. Supp. 1977).
46. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2159-A (Cum. Supp. 1977-78). When surveyed as
to how state laws or regulations influence their group insurance underwriting practices, insurers
generally indicated they believed themselves to be in compliance. While a few respondents
indicated that they only extend coverage based on conditions of employment, or do not seek
individual evidence of insurability or set rates based on individual evidence, it is noteworthy
that the majority who comply with state laws or the NAIC Model Bill typically have the right to
seek individual evidence of insurability for members of true groups and small groups. See note
49 Infra. They may then make classifications of insurability and non-insurability and base rates
on whatever factors they desire. See note 25 supra. The greater the consistency between state
group insurance regulations and the NAIC Model Bill, the greater the opportunity for the
insurer to discriminate on the basis of a handicap in group insurance underwriting.
When asked how they cope with the problem of underwriting insurance in several state with
differing group insurance regulations, 16 of the 19 respondents replied that they write according
to the laws of the state in which the policy is written. Two insurers said that they adopt the
most liberal practices to satisfy all the different states; one respondent stated that it underwrites
only on conditions of employment.
All but one of the insurers responded to a question about federal laws or regulations influenc-
ing their group insurance underwriting practices exactly as they did to the question about state
regulations, without mentioning civil rights legislation and differing federal policies regarding
discrimination on the basis of sex, see note 64 infra, age, see note 95 infra, and handicap. One
respondent stated "the primary influence is contract compliance guidelines."
When asked to specify any new federal or state laws that the) think are needed to aid
employers and themselves in providing insurance benefits for qualified handicapped employees,
fifteen of the nineteen respondents stated none were necessary.
Insurers also were asked what changes, if any, the insurance company could/should make in
its group underwriting practices to aid employers it insures in meeting their legal obligations
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laws regulating group insurance underwriters have prohibited classifi-
cations which are determined by conditions other than those pertain-
ing to employment in order to prevent the exclusion of identifiable
high-risk persons. Thus, only classifications such as management vs.
labor, full-time vs. part-time and salary vs. hourly employees are pos-
sible. 47  While insurers no longer have a right to classify on the basis
of important underwriting characteristics such as age and sex in order
to underwrite group insurance, they still have a right to classify on
the basis of physical and mental impairments which, for purposes of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, are handicapping conditions. 48  Al-
though the right to make a classification may be found under state
statutes, both the Section 503 and Section 504 regulations would ap-
pear to prohibit federal contractors or employers receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance from participating in insurance programs making
use of such classifications. The insurance industry has retained the
right to "exclude or limit the coverage of any person as to whom
evidence of individual insurability is not satisfactory to the insurer," 49
but a recent proposal submitted to the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) would change the language on classifica-
tion in the present model bill from "[T]he employees eligible for in-
not to discriminate on the basis of handicap in their employee benefits insurance programs.
Every response was "none." The response fails to recognize that several group underwriting
practices presently used conflict with employers' nondiscrimination obligations and may be il-
legal practices on the part of insurers as well.
47. Survey respondents were asked if there were conditions other than physical and mental
impairments and size of groups which would result in their refusal to underwrite group insur-
ance coverage for an employer having both handicapped and non-handicapped employees.
While a little more than one-third of the firms responded postively and submitted explanations
with regard to long-term disability insurance, only 20% of the firms answered in the affirmative
and gave explanations for the other four types of insurance. The business stability of the
employer seeking insurance was the condition most frequently given. Other factors which would
result in a refusal to underwrite were the hazard of the industry, undefined situations or condi-
tions that would be determined only on a case by case method, groups having an unusually high
proportion of hourly versus salaried employees, certain groups not having a true employer-
employee relationship, and employee groups considered ineligible because of other unspecified
characteristics. Other conditions cited that are more germane to handicapped employment were
individual considerations of late applicants, higher claim rates, and groups such as rehabilitation
clinics, sheltered workshops, or drug or alcohol counseling centers where there is an unusual
preponderance of handicapped in the group to be insured.
48. Not only do insurers express the right to exclude coverage of persons with handicapping
conditions in their model legislation, but also according to the survey, approximately 10% of the
insurers exercise this right in all lines of insurance except medical insurance where the figure is
over 15%.
49. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Group Life Insurance Defini-
tion of and Standard Provisions, 1956 NAIC PROCEEDINGS II, 362 (as amended, 1957 NAIC
Proceedings 1, 134).
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surance under the policy shall be all of the employees of the em-
ployer or all of any class or classes thereof determined by condition per-
taining to their employment"50 to "any class or classes thereof
established for other than insurance purposes." 5' The proposal
clearly specifies that insurance companies should not be allowed to
develop classifications that would be solely for insurance purposes. If
this proposal was accepted, it would be impossible for insurers to
manipulate the degree of risk they would experience in extending
group coverage to employers having handicapped workers.5 2  This
would appear to maximize the protection of handicapped persons
against discrimination in any employee insurance benefit program.
The practice of classifying groups as either true groups or small
groups also poses a problem for extending group insurance coverage
to groups having severely handicapped persons. Although the size of
a true group may vary from insurer to insurer, 53 the smallest true
group size for each insurer is one for which it has been able to com-
pete effectively in group insurance underwriting. Small groups pose
an underwriting risk similar to that experienced in underwriting indi-
vidual insurance. Below the small group minimum, the risks of ad-
verse selection are so great that insurers are prevented from under-
writing group policies either by company underwriting practices or in
some states through insurance regulations. When insurers underwrite
small groups, they employ a number of practices which allow them a
greater opportunity to reduce the risk and spread the loss. For in-
stance, they may require proof of insurability either by having each
potential insured complete a "short form" questionnaire concerning
his/her medical history and present state of health or through a medi-
cal examination. 5 4 Other insurers use pooling or trust arrange-
50. Id. at 361.
51. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE AND HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, Exhibit A, Suggested Modernization of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners' Model Bill 1 (November 1977).
52. Survey responses reveal that none of the insurers apply a special rate to a handicapped
person who is a member of a true group.
53. The survey found that the minimum number for which insurers would write a true
group policy varied according to the insurer and the type of insurance. For life, accidental death
and dismemberment, short term disability and medical insurance, the most frequent true group
minimum was 10 (15 out of 19 insurers). The other insurers' minimums were 50 or 100. For
long term disability insurance, only four out of 16 insurers used the minimum size of 10 while
the same number of insurers used 25 and 50 as the minimum. Other minimums reported for
long term disability were 15, 35, 100 and 200. The larger minimums for long term disability
reflect the insurer's need for larger groups to extend coverage for this high risk insurance.
54. The survey revealed evidence that insurability requirements vary with the line of insur-
ance and that short form evidence was required significantly more often than physical exams.
For life insurance, four of the thirteen insurers required no evidence, eight required short form
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ments 55 for small groups to combine the experience of several small
employers so that risk and losses can be spread over a larger number
of insureds and gain the advantages associated with a large group.
APPLICATION OF OTHER AREAS OF LAW
As an area of employment law, the field of employment discrimina-
tion and the handicapped is still in its infant stages, and the applica-
ble legal concepts have not yet been determined. The situation of the
handicapped is admittedly different from that of other groups who are
statutorily protected from employment discrimination. 56  Nonethe-
less, the most appropriate application of legal principles is probably
found in Title VII. 5 7  Broad anti-discrimination concepts have been
developed often in Title VII cases, providing a comprehensive body
of precedent to which to refer. However, Title VII itself has provided
for those instances in which good cause (either business necessity or a
bona fide occupational qualification) will excuse an employer's action
which would otherwise be viewed as having an illegal discriminatory
impact. While strong arguments have been advanced both for and
against inclusion of the handicapped under Title VII, 58 it appears
reasonable to apply at least the surrounding jurisprudence. 59
evidence and one required a physical exam. For accidental death and dismemberment, seven of
thirteen insurers required no eviddnce, five required the short form and only one required a
physical exam. The figures for short term disability insurance were 3, 8 and 1, respectively.
Long-term disability coverage had the most rigid requirements of evidence of insurability. Five
of the seven insurers required short form and the other two a physical examination. For medical
insurance, no physical exams were required, but 11 out of 14 companies required short form
evidence. These data indicate that the greater the risk, the greater the need for evidence.
55. All insurers responding to the survey use pools or trusts when insuring small groups for
all lines of insurance, with one exception. One of the seven firms that writes long-term disability
insurance for small groups uses experience rating regardless of group size.
56. In the case of women and racial minorities, the classifying characteristic is uniform from
one member of the group to the next. In all cases of employment discrimination concerning
race, and many cases concerning sex, there is no correlation between that characteristic and a
person's ability to perform a job. In dealing with the class of "handicapped persons," the charac-
terizing "handicap" is unique to each member of the group, however, and can be significant in
determing whether that person is indeed a "qualified handicapped individual" entitled to pro-
tection from employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Discrimination on the
basis of age probably encompasses mitigating circumstances most closely resembling those found
in discrimination on the basis of handicap.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20003 to - (1970).
58. See, e.g., Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26
EMORY L.J. 65 (1977). Comment, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM.
J.L. Soc. PROis. 457 (1974); Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights
of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 (1973): Comment, Potluck Protections for Handi-
capped Discriminates: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 8 Loy.-CHI. L.J. 84 (1977): [hereinafter cited as Potluck Protections].
59. The U.S. Department of Labor regulations apparently apply Title VII jurisprudence in
interpreting the non-discrimination obligation to mean that requirements which tend to screen
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In determining whether or not an insurance program is of a dis-
criminatory nature with regard to the handicapped, it is first neces-
sary to assess the generalizations and classifications made by the in-
surer. Where such a generalization tends to exclude handicapped
persons, is the insurer even justified in making it? As evidenced by
the Section 504 regulations, the moving spirit behind the demand for
preventing discrimination against the handicapped in employment is a
desire to be free from such a classification. 60 Persons with physical
and/or mental disabilities want first and foremost an individual as-
sessment of their abilities, rather than a cursory generalized classifica-
tion on the basis of their disabilities. Thus, the regulations prohibit
pre-employment inquiries, 61 use of employment criteria which tend
to screen out handicapped persons, 62 and the limitation, segregation
or classification of applicants or employees in any way that adversely
affects their opportunities or status because of handicap. 63
THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
AND BUSINESS NECESSITY TESTS
Under Title VII, the use of classifications and generalizations has
been looked upon with suspicion. The bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation defense included in the Act allows an employer to base his
decision upon any of the covered characteristics (except race) where
that characteristic is a "bona-fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular busi-
ness." 64  The existence of the BFOQ defense indicates congressional
recognition that, under certain circumstances, an employer may be
justified in taking into account an applicant's sex, for example, in
order to determine his or her suitability for a particular job. That an
employer would be justified in considering a person's handicap under
out qualified handicapped individuals must be job related and justified by business necessity,
unreasonable cost, or safety. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2) (1977).
Reponses to queries about court decisions influencing group insurance underwriting practices
showed little insight on the part of insurers into how important civil rights decisions could
influence the nature and extension of coverage and the rates charged. Examples of the re-
sponses are "we don't conflict with legal precedent," "they are not applicable," and "no change
since we cover handicapped employees the same as nonhandicapped employees."
60. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 Santa Clara
Law. 855 (1975).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1977).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13 (1977).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(3) (1977).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-2 (e) (1970).
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certain circumstances is equally logical. In the Title VII context,
however, the provision has been construed narrowly, and con-
sequently, the availability of the defense has been extremely limited.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 65
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit imposed a set of require-
ments which must precede the use of a classification or generalization
as a bona fide occupational qualification. The court in Weeks found
the defendant guilty of violating Title VII when it denied a switch-
man's job to an applicant because she was a woman. The court con-
cluded
that the principle of nondiscrimination requires that . .. in order
to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an
employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause
to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substan-
tialy all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved. 66
The court found the use of unverified generalizations to be a violation
of Title VII, 67 noting that the defendant had produced no evidence of
the general lifting abilities of women but had relied instead on
stereotyped characterizations.
The import of the Weeks test to the area of handicapped employ-
ment discrimination is most obvious in terms of hiring a handicapped
person. However, it may also have application to an assessment of
allegations of discrimination made against an insurer's classification of,
or generalizations about, a handicapped applicant for insurance cover-
age. Where an insurance company can factually verify the classifica-
tions and generalizations it uses and show some basis for the differen-
tiation, then its actions most likely will be justified and the allegation
of discrimination refuted. While statistical data with regard to such
factors as susceptability, higher risks, higher costs, and earlier death
is available for many of the conditions which are covered by the
statutory definition of "handicap," 68 the insurance industry itself ad-
mits that "there are many types of health conditions whose effects on
claim costs under various types of insurance coverage have not been
65. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
66. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). A corollary to the Weeks doctrine condemning the use of
unverified generalizations arises in the footnote to that decision, where the court noted that an
employer might be able to sustain his burden by showing that it would be "impossible or highly
impractical to deal with women on a individualized basis." Id. at n.5.
67. Id. at 236.
68. See note 40 supra.
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observed in such a way, as to provide a statistically significant base
for insurance ratings." 69
Individual determination would appear to be a concept implicit in
Title VII jurisprudence as well as in the Section 503 and 504 regula-
tions. In applying this concept, it may well be that the question of
whether insurance classifications are valid is intertwined with the
question of whether assignment to those categories is determined on
an individual basis. Is a handicapped person excluded or considered a
high risk merely because he has been labelled generically "handi-
capped," or has some determination been made that this particular
individual's handicap is one which falls within a valid classification?
In Usery v. Tamiami Tours, Inc., 70 the Fifth Circuit indicated that
an individual assessment in employment situations may be foregone
only "if all or substantially all members of a class do not qualify, or if
there is no practical way reliably to differentiate the qualified from
unqualified applicants in that class." 71 With regard to insurance
classifications of the handicapped, it is doubtful that such a statement
could ever be made. A broad spectrum of both type and severity of
mental and physical disabilities is included under the heading of
"handicap". The insurance companies can differentiate practically
among those disabilities for insurance purposes, and it is reasonable
to assume that all or substantially all members of the class of hand-
icapped persons differ vastly from one another for such purposes.
In apparent contradiction to their central theme of individual de-
termination, however, the Section 504 regulations make no allowance
for differences among members of the class of handicapped persons in
dealing with fringe benefits such as insurance. The regulations do not
allow specifically for differences in benefits or contributions between
those provided handicapped and non-handicapped employees. While
preliminary drafts allowed individual determination of insurability and
rate classification where actuarially justifiable, 72 the final regulations
may well have the effect of forcing all handicapped persons, regard-
less of the nature and severity of their impairment, into one broad
classification. Section 504 regulations themselves, although possibly
based on misleading information provided by the insurance indus-
69. Letter from American Council of Life Insurance to Secretary, Health, Education and
Welfare (regarding proposed § 504 regulations) (September 15, 1976).
70. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
71. id. at 236.
72. See note 16 supra.
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try, 73 are inconsistent with the individual determination requirement
of Weeks.
Individual evidence of insurability (with the possibility of exclusion
from coverage or higher rates) is a real dilemma for "small group"
employers. Without large numbers of insureds, the potential for ad-
verse selection is greatly increased, and just one or two substantial
losses can be devastating. A uniform group, one in which members
have an equal potential for loss, is difficult to attain in "small group"
situations without requiring evidence of insurability. If the insurance
principle is to function effectively and insurance benefits are to be
provided to small groups, then the requirement of evidence assuring
the reasonableness of the risk must be regarded as a legitimate busi-
ness necessity. Where pooling and trust arrangements are used, it
should be pointed out that such arrangements can create financial
inequities for a number of employers when one or more members of
the pool take on high risk, high cost employees. 74
Insurers need to maintain their right of individual determination,
so that the insurance principle remains fully workable. Since the cur-
rent federal regulations appear to be in direct conflict not only with
industry practices but their own underlying policies, either the courts
or the legislature will have to evaluate the classification practices of
group underwriters, the validity of data available on the risks of all
handicapped persons with the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act
and the applicability of Title VII.
A prima facie violation of Title VII is established by demonstrating
that a facially neutral classification has the effect of discriminating
against members of a defined class. 75 Absent proof of purposeful dis-
crimination, a violation will be found where the consequences of such
a classification are to "invidiously .. . discriminate on the basis of
race or other impermissible classifications." 76 The very fact that a
73. See notes 39 and 40 supra.
74. When high risk, high cost persons are employed in large groups, only that employer
pays an extraordinary premium. The critical point is that whenever persons with above normal
risks are provided insurance benefits, someone has to pay the extra cost. Insurers functioning
independently in a competitive market do not have the power to mandate that either a majority
or all of the population participate in the program so that risks and costs can be spread over the
entire population. If this were possible, the entire population could be experience-rated and a
uniform rate could be charged each participant.
75. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442
U.S. 405, 422 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Although the majority opinion in General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976), seemed to suggest that perhaps effect may never be a
controlling factor in a Title VII case, or that Griggs is no longer good law, four Justices specifi-
cally refuted that inference in separate opinions.
76. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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disproportionately large number of persons suffering from either a
physical or mental disability are either unable to obtain insurance,
can obtain it only at a considerably higher cost, or are subjected to a
limitation of coverage, is in itself significant enough to warrant the
application of a Title VII rationale. 77
Under Title VII the defense of business necessity is available to an
employer who can show that a discriminatory classification or means
of classification is job-related. 78 The test developed by the Fourth
Circuit to determine business necessity requires that the practice in
question be necessary for "the safe and efficient operation of the
business."79 The business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override its discriminatory impact, and the challenged practice must
carry out that purpose efficiently. Furthermore, there must be no
acceptable alternative policies available which could accomplish the
business purpose as well with a less discriminatory impact. 80
While insurance classification practices are at least facially neutral,
they do have an adverse effect on a disproportionately large number
of handicapped persons. 81 Some of these practices may be justifiable
by the insurance industry under a business necessity test, but it ap-
pears unlikely that all such classifications would be upheld under the
scrutiny of that test. By the very nature of their industry, insurance
companies are justified in not insuring certain high risks or in insur-
ing them only at a higher cost, and are, in fact, able to verify the
77. In handicapped discrimination cases, the question of intent is often a complicated and
emotional one. "Different treatment of the handicapped normally stems from benign and sym-
pathetic rather than vicious and intolerant motives," Wright, note 15, supra at 101-02. The
value of such paternalistic attitudes to the handicapped is highly questionable, however; and it
is also open to debate how many "intolerant motives" may actually be masquerading as "benign
and sympathetic" ones. To remove the question of intent and instead focus on the discriminat-
ory effect in many cases may be the fairest and most reasonable approach to cases of discrimina-
tion against the handicapped.
78. The business necessity doctrine requires that the standard be job-related, see, e.g.
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1973), and that its use be
essential to the safe and efficient operation of the business, see, e.g., United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
79. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
80. Id.
81. While Title VII is not directly applicable to insurance companies and iusurants because
it is applied specifically to employment, the underlying rationale is a useful analogy with regard
to the concept of discrimination in insurance. However, where Title VII jurisprudence is
applied to Section 503 and section 504 regulations, it does not become applicable to the insurer,
insofar as Section 503 regulations extend to federal subcontractors, as well as contractors, 41
C.F.R. § 60.741.1 (1977), and as Section 504 regulations prohibit a recipient from participating
in a relationship with an organization providing or administering fringe benefits to employees of
the recipient where that relationship has the effect of subjecting handicapped employees to
discrimination, 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(4) (1977).
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need for such action with sound statistical and actuarial data.82 How-
ever, justification does not exist with regard to all disabilities or indi-
viduals suffering from them. Despite the validity of the insurance
company's business purpose in making them, the classifications ap-
pear to be overinclusive in many cases. A preferred alternative 83 may
well be found in a redefinition of classes to include only those persons
or risks which are demonstrably] higher risks. By allowing disabilities
not proven as higher risks to be classified with those that have, the
insurance companies have created a class which is composed of nearly
all handicapped individuals and is based on an invalid generalization.
Since no business purpose is shown to exist as to a large portion of
that class, the effect upon the class is a discriminatory one, despite
the lack of intent on the part of the industry.
Where a handicapped person has the type of impairment which
demonstrably does result in extraordinary risks and costs, the busi-
ness necessity test should allow the insurer to reasonably respond to
those factors. In underwriting group insurance for true groups, busi-
ness necessity would seem to require that additional claims costs be
passed along to the employer and then uniformly to all members of
the group when they pay a portion of the premium. 84 This creates no
greater impact on a handicapped employee than on any other
employee, and would result in both equal contributions and equal
benefits for all employees.
EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION-EQUAL CONTRIBUTION OR
EQUAL BENEFIT?
Despite the shortcoming of the insurance industry, the employer's
responsibilities under Sections 503 and 504 remain. He may not dis-
criminate against qualified handicapped persons in "rates of pay or
other forms of compensation" 85 if he is a federal contractor, or in the
provision of "fringe benefits available by virtue of employment" 8 6 if
82. See note 40 supra.
83. See note 78 supra.
84. Data suggests higher claims costs are likely to occur for many severe impairments. See
note 40 supra. The Section 503 regulations excuse a contractor from making reasonable accom-
modations to the handicaps of its applicants or employees where the contractor can demonstrate
that to do so Would impose an undue hardship in the conduct of his business. Business necessity
and financial cost and expenses may be considered in determining the extent of his obligation,
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977). The Section 504 regulations similarly excuse a recipient from
making accommodation where an undue hardship would be imposed, and allow consideration of
factors concerning the recipient's facilities, employees, budget, and the nature of his operation
as well as the nature and cost of the necessary accommodation.
85. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4(a) (1977).
86. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(6) (1977).
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he receives federal financial assistance. Where an insurer's group
program invidiously discriminates against a handicapped person, the
regulations prohibit an employer's participation in that program. The
practices most likely to be found to discriminate against the handi-
capped are not confined to a few insurers, however, but are in fact
industry-wide. The employer is thus placed in a no-win situation until
reforms are made by the insurers.
Even with the necessary reforms in insurance, however, there will
remain instances where the insurance company will make a statisti-
cally and actuarially justifiable determination that an employee is
either uninsurable or a higher risk insurable only at a higher pre-
mium. When the insurance company passes this substantial cost in-
crease along to the employer, the question becomes one of what cost
is he obliged to assume. It is not clear whether non-discrimination
requires only that the employer make the same contribution for a
handicapped employee as for a non-handicapped worker (with the
handicapped employee making up the difference), or rather that the
employer provide each employee, handicapped or not, with the same
amount of coverage, regardless of the cost to him.
The question of what constitutes non-discrimination in the pro-
vision of insurance benefits has been addressed by both Congress and
the courts, with regard to sex and age. On two different occasions,
the Supreme Court has held that the denial of pregnancy benefits
under employee disability plans is not a prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sex. The Court found no violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendment in the State of California's exclu-
sion of pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage under its
employee benefits plans in Geduldig v. Aiello. 8 7  When a similar
claim was brought under Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert,8 8 the Court found Geduldig to be exactly on point.8 9 In both
87. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
88. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
89. In holding that no violation of Title VII existed absent any indication that the exclusion
of such benefits was a pretext for discriminating against women, the Supreme Court rejected
the unanimous conclusion of-the six courts of appeal which had previously addressed the ques-
tion.
See Communication Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on juris
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975)
reversed, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-99 (5th Cir. 1975); Satty
v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977); Hutch-
ison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037.
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Geduldig and Gilbert, the Court reasoned that there existed no risk
from which men were protected that women were not,90 and that in
terms of the aggregate risk protection derived from the program,
there was no evidence of discrimination against any definable group.
Moreover, the Gilbert Court reasoned that simply because an
employer's disability benefit plan is less than inclusive is not proof
that the package is worth more to men than to women. 91
The assumption that Gilbert is dispositive of the question of the
employer's obligation with regard to a handicapped employee 92 can
be made only by ignoring a factor essential to the Court's reasoning:
the fact that men and women do receive exactly the same benefits
when the employer makes equal contributions. 93 Both the Geduldig
and the Gilbert Courts relied heavily on the fact that there was no
risk from which men were protected in the plans in question that
women were not. A handicapped employee, however, often would
not be receiving coverage for the same risks where an employer made
only equal contributions. It has been argued that Gilbert implicitly
approves the exclusion of certain handicaps, as opposed to handi-
capped persons, from coverage, even without actuarial justification,
since "such an exclusion, distinguishing merely among medical risks
rather than among persons, would not constitute handicap discrimina-
tion at all." 94 Even if Gilbert does not precisely approve the exclu-
90. "The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential
recipients into two groups - pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits
of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes." Geduldig, supra note 87, at 496 n. 20.
Risks as used here is synonymous with condition of insureds; whereas in insurance, risk relates
to the probability that the insurer will experience a loss resulting from a condition.
91. "For all that appears, pregnancy related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique
to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed
parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially even-
handed inclusion of risks." [emphasis in original] General Electric Co., supra note 89, at 139.
92. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 15, at 84.
93. It is questionable whether the Gilbert Court was correct in its reasoning that pregnancy
is an additional risk, in light of the fact that there is virtually no condition of a male which is
excluded under the GE plan. Arguably, where conditions unique to the male sex received
coverage, men are receiving greater coverage than women if any condition exclusive to females
is simultaneously excluded. The Gilbert Court rejected this argument, however, and found no
difference in either the contributions made or the benefits received on behalf of either sex.
94. Wright, supra note 15, at 85. Such an argument is apparently based upon the Court's
finding that the GE plan was "nothing more than an insurance package which covers some risks,
but excludes others." 429 U.S. at 138. The flaw in such an argument is that the condition of a
handicapped person which would constitute the excludable risk would in many cases be one of
the very conditions against which non-handicapped persons are being insured.
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sion of risks unique to handicapped persons, it may approve the exc-
lusion of the risk of incurring that handicapping condition for all per-
sons involved.9 5 Gilbert may well be read as condoning across-the-
board exclusions of certian risks from coverage for both handicapped
and non-handicapped employees.
Federal legislation on age discrimination in employment prohibits
discrimination in hiring, compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment.9 6 However, it is not unlawful for an
employer to observe the terms of a bona-fide seniority system or
employee benefit plan (such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan) which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 9 7
The employee benefits exception to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act recognizes the use of actuarially validated class-
based characteristics such as the increased health problems of older
workers and their reduced longevity. 98 Where the employment of a
handicapped individual represents an actual, substantial increase in
cost (assuming that such an increase is actuarially valid) of employee
benefit plans to the employer, an approach S'imilar to that of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) may well be the one
most acceptable to all parties involved. As with the ADEA, the em-
phasis in dealing with employment and the handicapped should first
95. The distinction is whether or not the condition is a pre-existing one. Where an
employee begins work with an affliction requiring treatment, it is questionable whether the
continued costs of that treatment should automatically be assumed by the employer's insurance
plan since the very elemental insurance concept of risk is absent. Where that affliction is sig-
nificant only in terms of representing a higher risk of susceptibility to other conditions covered
by the employee benefit plan, however, then Gilbert can probably not be read as approving
merely contribution on the employer's part commensurate with what is provided for the non-
afflicted employee, when the aggregate coverage is disproptionate.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1977).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1977). To be considered bona-fide, a plan need not provide the
same pension, retirement or insurance benefits to older workers as it provides to younger work-
ers, so long as any difference between them is in accordance with the terms of a bona-fide plan.
29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1976). The Wage-Hour Division of the Department of Labor permits
older workers to be granted less insurance, pension or retirement benefits if payments made or
costs incurred on behalf of the older workers by their employer are equal to those made or
incurred on behalf of the younger workers. The Division also permits varying benefits for
employees in the age group protected by the Act where the benefits are determined by a
formula involving age or length of service. Wage-Hour Division, Interpretative Bulletin on Age
Discrimination in Employment, 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a). It is not clear, however, whether
employees in the age group protected by the Act may be excluded entirely from plan benefits.
98. "The bill takes into full consideration ... the problem of employers in the field of
pension and other benefit plans. The bill would permit the hiring of older workers without
requiring that they necessarily be included in all employee benefit plans. This provision is
designed to maximize employment possibilities without working an undue hardship on
employers in providing special and costly benefits." 113 CONC. REc. 3476 (1967).
1040
INSURANCE BENEFIT PLANS
and foremost be in promoting the hiring of handicapped workers on
the basis of their abilities. Where costs incident to that employment,
such as those arising from pension and insurance programs, become
so prohibitive to the employer as to thwart that very purpose, then
some alternative must be created. The ADEA has offered the
employer the option of hiring an older worker without incurring those
higher costs which are directly related to the person's age, and which
would otherwise lessen that person's attractiveness to the employer.
To hire a qualified handicapped individual without having to
assume additional insurance costs directly and reasonably related to
his handicap may be the most immediately viable approach to assur-
ing that he is in fact hired on the basis of his capabilities, rather than
passed over because of his disability.
Even if equal contribution by the employer on the part of both
handicapped and non-handicapped persons is viewed as equal treat-
ment, there remains the question of whether equal treatment actually
represents equality to the party deriving the lesser benefit. 99 While
Gilbert suggests that equal treatment is sufficient to avoid connota-
tions of discrimination, Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion
stated:
The Court's belief that the concept of discrimination cannot
reach disability policies effecting an additional risk, unique to
women . . . is plainly out of step with the decision three terms ago
in Lau v. Nichols, 100 interpreting another provision of the Civil
Rights Act. There a unanimous Court recognized that discrimina-
tion is a social phenomenon encased in a social context and there-
fore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the desired end-products
of the relevant legislative enactment, end-products that may de-
mand due consideration to the uniqueness of "disadvantaged" indi-
viduals. 101
99. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1165 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Equal Protection]:
Arguments about equality are thus arguments about criteria of relevance. The
difficulties involved in developing such criteria have occupied philosphers for cen-
turies. Despite the refinements that distinguish the theories of various philosophers,
most such theories represent variations on two basic notions of equality, first iden-
tified by Plato and Aristotle: numerical equality and proportional equality. The con-
trast between the two notions is illustrated by the difference between the right to
an equal distribution of things (property, happiness) and the equal right with re-
spect to the distribution of such things. According to the former, each individual is
to receive numerically identical amounts of benefits being distributed or the burden
imposed in the public sector, whereas the latter means only that all will receive the
same consideration in the distributional decision, but that the numerical amounts
distributed may differ. [emphasis in original]
100. See note 105 infra,
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"Equality" as a political notion is a difficult concept. In everyday
usage, it connotes comparison of some common quality or attribute
and takes on a meaning of sameness. Politically, however, the con-
cept is much less meaningful, because "no ready indication is given of
the common attribute with respect to which men are asserted to be
equal." 102 Legal arguments over equality thus become arguments
over criteria of relevance: is the relevant standard distribution of ben-
efits and/or burdens according to the individual's needs, according to
his merit, or with regard only to absolute numerical equality? 103
The Gilbert Court apparently ascribed to the principle of distribu-
tion according to a formula of numerical equality, concluding that the
differences between men and women were irrelevant characteristics
so long as the burdens imposed and benefits received by both were
shared equally. The Court, however, has not applied this same in-
terpretation of equality under all circumstances. On several other oc-
casions it has taken cognizance of differences of need for the benefit
in question, and consequently focused on the effect which a distribu-
tion of a benefit or burden has upon the relative needs of its recip-
ients. In so doing, the Court has either ignored or rejected the strict
concept of numerical equality found in Gilbert.
A violation of the Equal Protection Clause was found in Griffin v.
Illinois,10 4 where, although every person convicted in a criminal trial
was given a right of review by writ of error, only non-indigents were
101. 429 U.S. 159 (citations and footnotes omitted). Such a statment is particularly applicable
to the situation of the handicapped. In a letter accompanying the initial version of the proposed
HEW regulations for 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Snpp. V. 1975), former HEW secretary David Mathews
noted:
Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794], however, differs
conceptually from both titles VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and IX [of the
Education Amendments of 1972]. The premise of both Title VI and Title IX is that
there are no inherent differences or inequalities between the general public and the
persons protected by these statutes and, therefore, there should he no differential
treatment in the administration of Federal programs. The concept of Section 504,
on the other hand, is far more complex. Handicapped persons may require different
treatment in order to be afforded equal access to Federally assisted programs and
activities, and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute discrimination. The prob-
lem of establishing general rules as to when different treatment is prohibited or
required is compounded by the diversity of existing handicaps and the different
degree to which particular persons may be affected. Thus, under Section 504, ques-
tions arise as to when different treatment should be considered improper and when
it should be required.
41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976).
102. Development-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1160-61.
103. See note 99 supra.
104. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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actually able to take the appeal because of the requirement that a
transcript be furnished to the appellate court. While such transcripts
were made available to all defendants upon payment of a fee, in
adherence to a concept of numerical equality, indigent defendants
were found by the Court to be effectively denied access to review on
the basis of their wealth. The Court vacated and remanded for further
action in affording the petitioners adequate and effective review, with
the effect of requiring Illinois to take account of economic inequalities
not of its own creation in structuring its criminal appeals system. 10 5
Not only did the majority take a result-oriented, proportional ap-
proach to the concept of equality, they specifically found a strict
numerical approach to be in itself violative of equal protection.
Similarly, the Court in Lau v. Nichols 106 focused upon equality of
result rather than on equality of input, and found the failure of the
San Francisco school system to provide English language instruction
to approximately 1,800 non-English-speaking Chinese students to be
violative of Section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 10 7 Stating that
"lilt seems obvious that the Chinese-speaking minority receive fewer
benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents' school
system which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the educational program .... "10 the Supreme Court found a viola-
tion of Section 601 and reversed the court of appeals. Provision of the
same facilities, textbooks, teachers and curriculum was insufficient
under the Court's "result-oriented" concept of equality. 10 9
105. Developments-Equal Protection, supra note 99, at 1178.
106. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1977). This provision excludes recipients of aid who discriminate
against racial groups from participation in federal financial assistance. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in affirming denial of relief by the district court, found no violation of either
Section 601 or the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that "[e]very student brings to the start-
ing line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages caused by social,
economic and cultural background, created and continued completely apart from any contribu-
tion by the school system." 483 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1973).
108. 414 U.S. at 568.
109. The contradictory approaches to equility taken by the Lau and Griffin Courts on the one
hand, and the Gilbert Court on the other, can possibily be explained by a distinction found in
the programs involved in each of the cases. In Lau and in Griffin, denial of some additional
treatment of the parties involved resulted in the denial to those parties of access to the essential
process in question. Failure to provide a transcript barred the petitioner in Griffin from the
appellate process itself; while the students in Lau were deprived of any meaningful benefit from
the educational system through failure to provide English instruction. The female employees in
Gilbert, however, were not denied employment, or even equal wages. Rather, their right to an
additional and supplemental benefit was at issue. If, in fact, such a distinction did guide the
Gilbert Court, then it appears unlikely that provision of equal benefits to the handicapped
employee, regardless of the employer's contribution, would be mandated by that Court.
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Equal contribution on the part of both handicapped and non-
handicapped employees to a fringe benefit plan would be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of absolute numerical equality in assessing an
employer's responsibilities. The basic concepts of Sections 503 and
504, reasonable accommodation and individual determination, suggest
that the result-oriented approach is preferable to a strict numerical
equality approach. Section 504 regulations require that handicapped
persons be provided an equal opportunity to participate and benefit
from the aid, benefit, or service in question, and that different or
separate services are prohibited except when necessary to provide
equally effective benefits. 110 The term "equally effective" is intended
to encompass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, and
to acknowledge the fact that in order to meet the individual needs of
handicapped persons to the same extent that corresponding needs of
non-handicapped persons are met, adjustments to regular programs
or provision of different programs may be necessary."' Reasonable
accommodation is an attempt to overcome the effect of a person's
handicap in order to afford him an equal opportunity to achieve equal
results. Numerical equality would defeat such a purpose.
Skyrocketing medical costs make resolution of the problem of pro-
viding health insurance to the handicapped imperative. Someone
must take responsibility for the health costs of the handicapped, and
it is no more feasible to expect the handicapped person to rely solely
on his pocketbook than it is to expect any other individual to do the
same. In the event of serious illness or accident, it is a very small
percentage of the entire population which would even be capable of
paying all of its own expenses out-of-pocket. The needed reforms can
be attained only by a joint effort among the federal and state govern-
ments, the insurance industry, and the employer.
First of all, there must be a realization that true insurance is a
risk-oriented concept covering only fortuitous losses. At the same
time, however, another basic tenet of insurance cannot be pushed
aside-the idea of risk distribution. "[I]nsurance is illustrative of the
idea of cooperation. The people bear together, and by distributing it
over a period of years, it is less of a burden." 112 While economics
dictate that the insurer should not be prohibited from reflecting the
110. 45 C. F. R. § 84.11 (1977).
111. Appendix A - Analysis of Final Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685 (1977).
112. Address by William Jennings Bryan in front of 1914 Proceedings, National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (September 18, 1914), reprinted in T. KIMBALL & H. DENNENBERC,




degree of risk being undertaken, social policy interjects a demand for
some socialization of risk, that is, an extension of insurance coverage
without necessarily involving an equitable distribution of cost, on
purely social grounds rather than economic ones.
113
A balancing of' these two principles of insurance must then guide
insurers, employers and government in providing for the insurance
needs of the handicapped. Initially it should fall to the states to regu-
late more strictly the classification and rating practices of the insurers.
Classifications should be allowed only on the basis of sound actuarial
justification, not on the basis of industry speculation often resulting
from unverifiable myths, genei'alizations and stereotypes. Price differ-
ences should be permitted, but only insofar as they reflect actual cost
differences.
Where coverage of a handicapped person under an employee-
benefit plan results in such a permissible increase in price, it is
merely good business to allow the insurer to pass that increase along
to the employer. While the employer should not necessarily shoulder
full responsibility for the insurance needs of a handicapped employee
where a substantial additional cost is involved, he too should be
called upon to bear a portion of the responsibility for the welfare of
the handicapped. Moreover, the employer can and will pass his -in-
crease along to other employees and consumers in a competitive
economy. 114 The "burden" "' to the shareholders, consumers,
employees, and insurers resulting from passed-on costs is a not newly
created one. As taxpayers, they are presently maintaining responsibil-
ity for many of the health needs of the handicapped through social'
welfare programs.
Society has an unquestionable obligation to provide for the needs of
its disabled members, and will be assessed the cost in one way or
another. By assuming the cost in a manner which allows the hand-
icapped individual to be employed gainfully, both society and the
handicapped individual would be benefitted: the dignity of the dis-
abled individual would be preserved, and society and the economy
would be receiving the handicapped person's contributions of time,
effort and ability in exchange for the benefits it must otherwise confer
113. T. KIMBALL & H. DENNENBERG, supra note 112, at 7. "In the automobile liability field
one sees tremendous pressures of this kind toward the socialization of risk by provision of
insurance for everyone at a price that is reasonable in terms of what the people in question can
afford to pay, or think they can afford to pay, and not in terms of the burdens imposed on
society by their driving cars." Id. at 7-8.




gratuitiously. Although these underlying principles are contained in
the Section 503 and 504 regulations, the purposes are not achieved,
mainly because full responsibility is placed upon the employer alone.
Equitable and proportionate distribution of the costs involved may
not be achievable completely if left only to economic controls. Some
direct government intervention may well be necessary to assure that
handicapped persons are able to meet the potential expenses of both
their present and possible disabilities. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article to recommend any concrete reform packages, cer-
tain areas do merit future exploration. Insurers may be able to design
programs particularly for the high-risk handicapped which are similar
to the assigned-risk and pooled-risk programs which have been de-
veloped for high-risk drivers. Provisions might be enacted by legisla-
tures modeled on the "second-injury funds" established by workmen's
compensation statutes, in which liability is imposed on the employer
or his insurer only for the degree of disability resulting from the in-
jury arising out of employment with his company. The increment of
disability resulting from the pre-existing impairment is compensated
by the second injury find. 116 National health insurance programs or
reforms in Medicaid and/or Medicare which would raise permissible
income levels or other changes in eligibility requirements, might also
be viable solutions to at least part of the problem.
CONCLUSION
Providing insurance to the handicapped tinder employee benefit
plans is a real problem for handicapped individuals, employers and
insurers. The insurance industry, however, is compounding rather
than alleviating the problem, and consequently preventing others
from reaching any resolution. Legislative solutions have been at-
tempted but with disappointing results. Administrative regulations
also have been disappointing because they lack clarity and have per-
sisted in placing the full responsibility for insuring the handicapped
upon the employer. A more desirable approach would place a joint
responsibility among several societal interests. The purpose of the
legislation, encouraging equal employment of qualified handicapped
individuals, is attainable only if consideration is given to the question
of who should bear the economic responsibilities which are not solved
by employment, and in what proportion those responsibilities should
be borne.
116. Potluck Protections, supra note 58, at 822-33.
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